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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY RODGERS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Case No. 15334

ANNIE N. HANSEN and
ALBERT J. HANSEN,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff to quiet title to the
subject property in herself.

Defendants counterclaimed seeking

to quiet title to a two-thirds interest in the subject property
in themselves and a one-third interest in plaintiff as trustee
for the heirs of Myrtle Neil (among whom are numbered plaintiff
and the defendant, Annie N. Hansen).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Peter F. Leary,
District Judge, sitting without jury on September 23, 1976.
Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on March 25, 1977.
(R.123-124.)

The judgment dismissed plaintiff's complaint

.:ith prejudice and granted judgment in favor of defendants on

(Id.)
'' ~ 1' CounSponsored
tcrclaim.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment with regard
to the dismissal of her Complaint and with regard to the
granting of defendant's Counterclaim insofar as it relates to
their two-thirds interest in the subject property.

Plaintiff

does not seek reversal of the court's determination that she
was holding the interest which she received from Myrtle C.
Neil in trust for Mrs. Neil's heirs.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
By a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 25, 1942,
William and Vivian Newsome agreed to sell the subject property
to Harold and Myrtle Neil.

(Ex. 1-P.)

under the contract was $3,250.00.

The purchase price

(Id.)

Because the Neils

were experiencing financial difficulties, their daughter and
son-in-law, defendants here, assisted them in making the downpayment and in paying a number of the monthly installments
due under the contract.

(Tr. 68-72.)

In all, defendants paid

$725.00 prior to the final balloon payment of $2,389.00.

(Id.,I

During the time that the defendants were aiding the Neils to
meet their obligations under the contract, Mr. Neil died.
(R. 19-20.) Thereafter, defendants sold an unrelated piece of
real estate and used the proceeds f rora the sale thereof to
pay the balance due under the contract, $2,389.00.
paragraph 2; Tr. 72.)

(R.96,

On July 7, 1944, the Newsomes executed

a warranty deed conveying the subject property to "Myrtle C.
Neil and Annie N. Hansen and Albert J. Hansen, her husband
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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as joint tenants and not as tenants in common".

(Ex.

2-P.)

After execution of the warranty deed, defendants
allowed Mrs. Neil to remain in possession of the subject
property and to retain rents paid by boarders.

(Tr. 73-75.)

Although there appears to have been no specific agreement in
this regard, there was apparently an understanding between the
parties that Mrs. Neil would pay the taxes and maintain the
property.

Defendants offered occasional financial assistance

in paying the taxes and assisted Mrs. Neil in providing maintenance and repairs.

(Id.)

Beginning with a receipt dated October 20, 1944,
Annie Hansen executed a series of 43 receipts purporting to
show receipt of a total of $1, 334. 00 from Mrs. Neil.

(Ex. 6-P.)

The first of these receipts shows a "previous balance" of
$2,389.00, and payment of $25.00 for "payment on house
412 North 2nd West".

The last such receipt, dated August 5,

1949, shows a balance due of $1,055.00.

Although this parti-

cular receipt does not show the purpose for which the payment
was made, the receipts typically state that the payment
(usually $25.00) was for "payment on house" or "payment on
home".
When asked about the purpose of these receipts at
trial, defendants responded that the receipts were given to
Mrs. Neil to aid her in obtaining additional welfare benefits.

Defendants acknowledged, however, receipt of money from Hrs. Neil
'''l ,, sporadic basis.

(Tr. 78-79, 85-86.)

In most cases

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mrs. Neil did not specify the purpose for which the money was
given (Tr. 87); however, some payments were given to the Hansen,
to be delivered to a creditor. (Tr. 84-85.)
In 1958, apparently upset by a proposed sale of the
property by the Hansens, Mrs. Neil contacted an attorney,
Emmett L. Brown, who, by a letter dated September 29, 1958,
wrote to the Hansens.

In his letter Mr. Brown objected to

the proposal that the Hansen's take two-thirds of the appreciated value of the property.

He also explained Mrs. Neil's

concern that because of the joint tenancy she would not be
able to leave her interest to all of her heirs.

He acknow-

ledged that Mrs. Neil was aware that the Hansens claimed the
property as joint tenants.

(Id.)

Mrs. Hansen responded by

a letter dated September 30, 1958, in which she reaffirmed
the right of her and her husband to two-thirds of the proceeds
of the sale of the house.

(Ex. 14-P.)

On February 12, 1964, in an effort to sever the joint
tenancy between herself and defendants, Mrs. Neil conveyed
her interest in the property by quit claim deed to the plaintiff.

On the same date, plaintiff reconveyed the property

to Mrs. Neil, thus destroying the joint tenancy as between
Mrs. Neil and the defendants.

(Ex. 3-P, Ex. 4-P.) At trial

plaintiff admitted that at the time of the above transactions
Mrs. Neil was aware that defendants asserted a two-thirds fee
interest in the subject property.

(Tr. 39.)

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the summer of 1968, several members of the family,
including Mrs. Neil, defendants, and plaintiff met at defendant's home in Ogden, Utah, at plaintiff's request to discuss Mrs. Neil's will. (Tr. 76, 88.)

During the conversation

plaintiff took the lead in stating that the Hansens had loaned
money to Mrs. Neil and that she had repaid all but $250.00
of the debt.

(Tr. 32-33.)

Although the evidence is dis-

puted, Mrs. Neil apparently said nothing during the conversation.

(Tr.

77, 89, 102.)

In the course of the meeting,

defendants reaffirmed their belief that they were owners of
a share of the subject property (Tr. 37,101-102), at the same
time denying existence of a loan.

(Tr. 76, 100-101.)

Mrs. Neil died on August 24, 1975, without ever having
attempted to seek a legal determination of her rights in the
property.

Shortly before her death, Mrs. Neil executed a

second quit claim deed in favor of plaintiff.

(Ex. 5-P.)

Prior to her death she executed a will which directed her
executrix, Mrs. Rogers, to distribute her estate equally
among her six children.

(Ex. 8-D.)

Plaintiff commenced the present action on September
12, 1975.

In her Complaint, plaintiff alleged that the parties

to the 1944 Deed intended that Mrs. Neil would receive fee
title to the subject property subject only to a mortgage interest in favor of defendants.

(Record p. 2-4.)

-5-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT DEFENDAl'JTS OIVN A FEE INTEREST
RATHER THAN A MORTGAGE IN THE PROPER'I'Y.

Plaintiff claims that the 1944 Warranty Deed which oni
face purports to convey the subject property to Mrs. Neil and to
defendants was in fact intended to create the relationship of
mortgagor/mortgagee between Mrs. Neil and the defendants.

Thus,

the critical question of fact which the court below was called m
to determine was what the intent of the parties to the deed was.
Contrary to plaintiff's allegations, the trial court
found that the parties intended that the 1944 Deed conveyed the
subject property to Mrs. Neil and the defendants as joint tenant
and that no mortgage was intended.

The relevant findings of fac'.

by the trial court state:

6.

Prior to the time of execution of the Warranty
Deed, Mrs. Neil agreed that defendants would
be named as joint tenants thereon. Upon its
execution, she received a copy of the deed
which she took to the county recorder's office
for recordation.

7.

The granters under the Warranty Deed intended
to convey the property in joint tenancy to
defendants and Mrs. Neil. Mrs. Neil never
asked the granters to change the deed nor did
she ever express dissatisfaction as to its
provisions.

8.

Defendants neither agreed with Mrs. Neil that
they would sell their interest in the subject
property to her nor that they would treat the
Warranty Deed as conveying the property to
Mrs. Neil only, while creating a mortgage
interest in themselves.
(R. 111.)

This court has long adopted the view that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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evide~r

should be reviewed in the light most favorable to sustain the
findings of the tryer of fact.

Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349

(Utah 1975).
Even in equity actions where this court has the prerogative of reviewing the evidence, the presumption has been adopted
that the tryer of fact is better

able to weigh the evidence and

veracity of testimony than an appeals court, and therefore that the
evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to sustain the
trial court's findings.

As to the review of the findings of the

court in an equity of action, this court has stated:
Notwithstanding the fact that in an equity case
such as this it is our prerogative to review the
evidence, we ordinarily re~os~ sorne confidence in
the verity of the actions of the trial court; and
assume that he believed those aspects of the evidence which are in accord with his findings and
judgment. Foster v. Blake Heights Corporation,
530 P.2d 815, 816 (Utah 1974).
Thus, in Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 34, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972),
this court was called upon to determine whether the trial court was
correct in finding that certain payments had been made against one
of two loans.

The court refused to overturn the trial court's

findings saying:
[T)he trial court did not adopt defendant's interpretation of the transaction; this was a factual
determination which cannot be disturbed on appeal.
Id., at 1346 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354

(Utah 1975),

the appellant alleged that the findings of an advisory jury in an
equity action and the findings and decision of the court were not
supported by the evidence.

In affirming the trial court's decision

Hns court stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It seems necessary and appropriate to reiterate
the oft stated rule of review:
that we are
obliged to survey the record, not as the defendant
views the facts from his defensive position, but
in the light favorable to the findings made by
the advisory jury and to the findings and decision
made thereon by the trial court.
Id., at 356.
The trial transcript and the documentary evidence int
instant case indicate that there was ample support for the court
findings that the parties to the 1944 Deed did not intend
Neil would receive the entire fee estate.

that~

That evidence include

the following:
(a)

Albert Hansen, one of the parties to the 1944 Dee.

gave the following testimony:
Q. Did you discuss the fact with Mrs. Hansen
that you planned on having three of the names on the
deed?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know who it was who suggested to Mr.
Newsome that three names be placed on the deed?
I suggested it.
A.
Q.
Did you discuss that with Mrs. Neil before yo
did it?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she ever raise any objection to that
procedure?
A.
No.
Q.
Did you enter into any sort of agreement witf:
Mrs. Neil concerning income from the property if any
was generated?
A. No.
Q. What about the payment of taxes?
A. Well, we--she and I figured that if she paid
the taxes that would be fair enough as long as she w~
living in the place.
Q.
Then did you agree that she would remain in
possession of the house?
A. Yes, as long as she lived.
Q. And upon her death?
A. Well, at that time we just figured that if
it was either any of us it would go to the other two.
Q.
Did you ever agree with Mrs. Neil that you
would convey your interest in the property to her?
A.
No.
Q. Was there ever any agreement that the deed
from Mr. Newsome would convey only a mortgage interes
to you?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. No.
Q.
Did you ever agree that Mrs. Neil would
pay you back for the moneys you spent on the house?
A. No, she never had any obligations.
(Tr. 72 (lines 29-30), 73 (all), 74 (lines 1-3).)
~1r.

Hansen's uncontradicted testimony clearly supports

the court's finding that the 1944 Deed was intended to create the
very type of relationship between the grantees described thereon,
namely, that of joint tenants--not that of mortgagor and mortgagees.
(b)

Similarly, in her testimony at trial and in her

deposition, I1rs. Hansen, another party to the 1944 Deed, described
the relationship between the grantees as that which is recognized
at law as a joint tenancy:
Q.
Now, was there any kind of an understanding,
or an agreement, that you had with your mother between
1942 and 1944 when you were making these payments?
A.
She said, when we went to pay off the big
payment, that if we would pay it off, why, then and
put her name on the deed, why then it would be all
equal, and when she was through with it, why then the
property would belong to us, vice versa, with us.
We figured that if we died before she did, why
then, it would be the other two.
(Deposition of
Annie Hansen P. 9, lines 9-lB)
Concerning the existence of the alleged loan and mortgage,
Hrs. Hansen gave the following testir:iony:
Q.
!1rs. Hansen, it has been alleged that there
is an agreement between your mother and you and your
husband that you would - that you would loan her the
money. Was there ever such a loan?
A. There was never a loan. We paid off the
house.
She had a name on the deeds. She was living
in the house, so why would we need a loan?
Q.
Did you ever agree to convey your interest
in the property to her?
A. Never did.
(Tr. B7 (lines 29-30), BB (lines 1-3) (emphasis added).)

(c)
liter

Gayla Hansen, daughter of the defendants, and grand-

of Mrs. Neil testified that in a conversation she had with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mrs. Neil in 1968, her grandmother spoke of her one-third inter,
in the subject property:

Q.
. . . What did she say?
A.
She said, "\,Jell, I just -" toward the
end of the whole discussion she just said to me
tl1at, well, she thought she could do with her third
what she wanted to.
Q. Did she use the word "one-third"?
A. Yes sir.
(Tr. 101 (lines 21-26).)
It is perhaps stating the obvious to remark that Hrs.
Neil's acknowledgment that she considered herself to be a one-tr.
interest holder in the subject property is inconsistent with the
plaintiff's theory that Mrs. Neil owned the entire fee estate
subject only to a mortgage in favor of defendants.
{d)

As early as 1958, Mrs. Hansen in response to a

letter, had written to her mother's attorney that she and her
husband claimed a two-thirds interest in the property and thatt
money which they paid for the house was not intended as a loan.
Mrs. Hansen wrote:
We have no intentions of selling the house she [i.e.,
Mrs. Neil] is living in now or ever. We bought the
house for her to live in, enjoy [sic] do what she
wants to in so she would always have a roof over her
head. We have never asked her for one penney of
anything •
. . So we offered her our little new
rambler to live in and sell her house and finish
the one we have started for ourselves and give her
1/3 of the money we got from the house to live on
or whatever she wanted to do. We asked nothing
except 2/3rds. . . .
(Letter to Emmett L. Brown
dated September 30, 1958, Exhibit 14P)
The above passages clearly express the belief of the
defendants that Mrs. Neil was not obligated to repay them fort
having purchased the property.

The letter also shows that it

the view of the Hansens that if the property were sold,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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t

they~

be entitled to two-thirds 0£ the proceeds of the sale.

such a

belief is consistent with the Hansen's contention that the deed
was intended to convey a two-thirds interest as joint tenants to
them, but inconsistent with the allegation that they intended to
take only a mortgage in the subject property.
(e)

The 1944 Warranty Deed states unequivocally that

Myrtle C. Neil, Annie Hansen and Albert Hansen were to receive the
property as joint tenants.

(Exhibit 2P.)

Mrs. Neil obviously knew

of the Deed's provisions, since she was the person who recorded it.

The foregoing evidence presented at trial at the very
least demonstrates that the trial judge was on firm evidenciary
ground when he found that the parties to the 1944 Warranty Deed
intended that the grantees would receive the property as joint
tenants and not as mortgagor (Mrs. Neil) and mortgagees (Defendants).
Plaintiff attempts to avoid the fatal effect of the
trial court's findings on her appeal by directing this court's
attention to certain receipts bearing Mrs. Hansen's signature and
by citing the rule that this court is not bound by the interpretation of documents applied by the trial court.
Associates, 552 P.2d 126, 123 (Utah 1976).

See

Lake v. Hermes

The weakness of this

argument is that as shown by the discussion above, there was ample
evidence to support the court's findings without resort to an
t

interpretation of the receipts.

Indeed, the court's finding con-

""rning the receipts does not appear to indicate that the court
·':!.wheel any special significance to them.
:. La tes:

The relevant Finding

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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9. Beginning on October 20, 1944, and extending
up until August 5, 1949, defendant, Annie Hansen
executed a series of 43 receipts purporting to
show payments by Mrs. Neil to Mrs. Hansen in the
total sum of $1,159.00. These receipts stated
that the payments evidence thereby were "for
payment on house" or "for payment on home".
The last receipt dated August 5, 1949 indicated
there was a balance due of $1,055.00. Mrs. Neil
made no payments to defendants after that date.
(Tr. 111-112)
Similarly, the court's Conclusions of Law based upon:
above Finding contain no indication that it relied on the receir
indetermining the intention of the parties.

The only reference

to the receipts is found in Conclusion 8 which states:
The receipts executed by Mrs. Hansen were insufficient to take the alleged agreement out
of the Statute of Frauds under the Doctrine of
Part Performance or Written Memorandum.
(Tr. 114)
Since the Findings and Conclusions show that the tria:
court did not rely upon any particular interpretation of the re·
ceipts, and since there was ample other evidence of a nondocurne:
character to support its findings, the rule in Lake v. Hermes
Association, supra, has no relevance.
A more serious flaw in appellant's argument is thats
has

f~iled

to meet her burden of proof in overcoming the clear

langugage of the 1944 Deed.
It is a well-accepted rul2 in this jurisdiction that
presumption of truthfulness and accuracy accorded written instr
can only be overcome "by clear and convincing evidence."
Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454

(Utah 1975).

This rule has been appl

cases where the court has been asked to declare a deed
be in fact a mortgage.

In

He~s

~

absolu~

v._.?:nger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P.

(1919), which involved the issue of equitable mortgage, the co'
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s ta tccl:

We are not unmindful that in this class of cases
the oral testimony of witnesses should be
scrutinized by the court with great care and
that the proof should be olain and convincing
before the court is authorized to declare upon
the intention of the parties. Id., at 234
(emphasis added).
~
Similarly, in Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey,
105 Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943), the court refused to reverse the
lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action to have a quit
claim deed declared a mortgage on the grounds, inter alia, that the
proferred evidence was not such "clear, definite, unequivocal, and
conclusive evidence as is required to declare a deed a mortgage • •
Id., at 287.
Thus, a successful attack on a deed absolute must be
based upon more than a mere preponderance of the evidence.

An

examination of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff at the trial
demonstrates that the trial court was correct in ruling that the
plaintiff had not met her burden of proof.
Plaintiff's evidence consisted primarily of plaintiff's

s:

own testimony and of the receipts referred to above.

Mrs. Rogers

was not a party to the transactions and to conversations leading up
to the execution of the 1944 Deed.

However, she attempted to show

that her mother understood that the deed actually created a mortgage

by relating conversations she had had with her mother.

The first

of these conversations took place in 1964 in the office of her
fllother's attorney.

Concerning this conversation Mrs. Rogers'

trstimony is as follows:

Q. Tell us uhat your mother told Mr. King
rt'lative to iler understanding as to the ownership
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"

A. Well, she felt like the home was hers and
that the deed was - very misleading about the nd0cs
on it. And she felt like - well she told him that
she had paid the house, the money back for the llan.o~r::
and she had paid all the taxes and all of the upkeep.
And the house was hers as far ilS she was concerne.J,
as she wanted that severed. And the only way to do
it, he said, was - without them doing something wi~
her - would be to do the quit claim deed.
(Tr. 30 (lines 10-20) .)
The second conversation testified to by Mrs. Rogers tc
place in 1968 in the defendant's home.

According to Mrs. Roger:

in the course of that conversation, which involved several membc
of the family, Mrs. Neil stated that she thought she still owed
Hansens about $250.00 and that the Hansens had agreed to charge
no interest.

(Tr. 33 (lines 21-24),

34

(lines 7-8).)

Concerning these alleged conversations the following
observations are relevant.

First, the conversations took place

18 years and 8 years,respectively,prior to the time of trial.

The trial court in weighing the credibility of the evidence

~~

reasonably have concluded that Mrs. Rogers' testimony was so
clouded by the passage of time as to have lost its probative va:
Indeed, the remarks which Hrs. Rogers attributed to her mother
were expressed only once as a direct quote.

(Tr. 34

(lines 7-81

On oti1er occasions Mrs. Rogers' paraphrasing of her mother's
was prefaced by the words "she felt like.

"

(Tr. 30

co~

(line 12

Tr. 33 (line 11) .)
In addition, Mrs. Rogers' testinony as to the remark:
made by her mother in the 1968 meeting are directly contradicti
by the testimony of both defendants and of their daughter (Tr.
77

(line 11), 89 (line 14), 102 (lines 11-19).)

Under the cir·

curnstances it would not be surprising if the trial judge fell
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t

~~s.

Rogers' testimony fell short of the standard of "clear, definite,

unequivocal and conclusive" evidence required by Thornley Land &
Livestock Co. v. Gailey, and Hess v. Anger, supra.

As to the

testimony concerning the intent of a decedent, this court has
observed:
It is generally recognized that testimony concerning
intent of one who is deceased should be looked upon
with caution; and this is particulary true when such
testimony is suffused with self-interest. Pagano v.
Walker, supra, at 454.
Second, even if Mrs. Rogers' testimony were accepted as
being completely accurate, and if the Hansen's testimony were disregarded, it does not follow that evidence of the existence of a
mortgage was so "clear, definite, unequivocal and conclusive" as
to lead the court ineluctably to the conclusion that the relationship between Mrs. Neil and the defendants was that of mortgagor/
mortgagee.
(a)

Mrs. Rogers' testimony can be summarized as follows:

Mrs. Neil believed the house was hers; and (b) Mrs. Neil

believed that she was indebted to the Hansens and that she had
repaid most of that debt.

Such facts, if true, would be consistent

with a variety of relationships between Mrs. Neil and the defendants.
It is reasonable to assume,

for example, that Mrs. Neil believed

the house was hers because she was a joint tenant and that she
had a moral obligation to repay the Hansens for their largess in
buying the house and placing her name on the deed as a joint tenant.
In the alternative, Mrs. Neil may have believed that she was
l' 1Jrchasing the Hansen's two-thirds interest in the property under

an oral contract.
1

She may even have believed that she was under

le: ;,::11 obligation to repay the Hansens and that until she did so
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she could not sever the joint tenancy.

Thus, Mrs. Neil's state

ments could not be said to comprise the type of clear and

con~

evidence which this court has required for setting aside an

~i

deed.
Finally, plaintiff places great reliance upon a serie:
of 4 3 receipts executed by Mrs. Hansen purporting to acknowledg:
receipt of various sums of money from Mrs. Neil (Exhibit 6P.)
Upon examination, however, these receipt prove to be as incooct
sive as Mrs. Rogers' testimony.
With some exceptions, the receipts in question contair,
the following information:

Date (from October 20, 1944 to Augu:

5, 1949), person paying the money (Mrs. Neil), person receiving
the money (Mrs. Hansen), amount of payment (usually $25.00),
previous balance ($2,389.00 on receipt #1), the balance due
($1,055.00 as of the date of the last receipt) and the purposec
the payment (usually "payment on house" or "payment on home").
These receipts suffer from the same paucity of detail
as the remarks attributed to Mrs. Neil in .Mrs. Rogers' testirnon'
If, for example, Mrs. Neil had been buying the property from thi
~

Hansens under an installment contract for sale, the receipts
be exactly the same as those found in Exhibit 6P.

Similarly,

receipts in question could demonstrate that Mrs. Neil repaid
the Hansens because they purchased the home for her and allowe:
her to live in it during her life.

Thus, the receipts lack

t~

clarity and conclusivness necessary to overcome the absolute
In light of the above analysis, the trial court was
clearly correct in ruling as one of its conclusions of Law:
-16-
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There is no clear and convincing evidence of the
intent of the parties to the 1944 Deed to have
created a relationship other than a joint tenancy
as between the grantees.
since there is sufficient evidence to support the court's Findings
and Conclusions, the judgment should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Because of ambiguities in plaintiff's Complaint and in
plaintiff's response to subsequent attempts by defendants; counsel
to clarify plaintiff's theory for quieting title, the trial court
and defendants' counsel assumed that one of plaintiff's theories
was that Mrs. Neil had entered into a contract with defendants for
purchase of their two-thirds interest in the property.

Since there

was no evidence that such an agreement existed in written form, the
court correctly ruled that such an agreement would have been barred
by the statute of frauds.

(See the trial court's Conclusion No. 7

(Tr. 113) .) As plaintiff has now unequivocally stated that hers is
an action to quiet title based upon the doctrine of equitable
mortgage,

(see plaintiff's Statement of the Kind of Case) plaintiff

argues that the statute of frauds is inapplicable to this action.
In this regard, defendants respectfully submit that under the
peculiar facts of this case the statute of frauds is applicable
and does bar plaintiff's action.
A.

THIS ACTION FALLS WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Utah's Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Ann.
11'.!53)

provides:
No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, ass~gning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
An exception to the above rule is found in Section 25-5-2 which
states:
The next preceeding section shall not be construed
. • • to prevent any trust from arising or being
extinguished by implication or operation of law.
h~

In general, this latter provision (Section 25-5-2)

been construed by the courts to take equitable mortgages out of·
statute of frauds on the theory that the transferee of a deed
intended as a mortgage holds the deed in constructive trust for
the transferor.

The Restatement describes the above rule as fol

(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transf~s
it inter vivas to another in trust for the transferor,
but no memorandum properly evidencing the intention tc
create a trust is signed, as required by the statute
of frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the
trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a constructive trust for the transferor, if

(c)
The transfer was made as security for an indeb'.
ness of the transferor
Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, §44 (1954).
The above rule has been adopted by Utah courts in sue'
cases as Wasatch Mineral Co. v. Jennings, 5 Utah 243, 15 P.65, •
(1887), and Taylor v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343,
(1972).

13~

It is significant to note, however, that in both of fr

above cases the mortgagor had executed a deed absolute in favor
the mortaagee.

Indeed, plaintiff freely admits that she has

~

unable to find any Utah cases in which an equitable mortgage wi
created by means of a conveyance

fro~

a third-party grantor to
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grantees who bore the relationship of mortgagor/mortgagee to one
another.

(See Appellant's Brief, P. 9.)
The above quoted passage from the Restatement clearly

relates only to situations in which A conveys to B by absolute deed,
but intends only to create a mortgage interest in B.

Under such

circumstances, the transaction is clearly within the trust exception to the statute of frauds since the law imposes a constructive
trust on the property.

This is not the case where A conveys to B

and C, intending to convey the property in fee to B subject to a
mortgage in favor of C.

Under such circumstances, Section 45 of

the Restatement sets forth a different rule:

(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers
it inter vivas to another in trust for a third person
but no memorandum properly evidencing the intention
to create a trust is signed, as required by the statute
of frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the
trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a
constructive trust for the third person, if, but only
if,
(a)
The transferee by fraud, duress or undue
influence prevented the transferor from creating
an enforceable interest in the third person, or
(b)
The transferee at the time of the transfer
was in a confidential relation to the transferor,
or
(c)
The transfer was made by the transferor in
anticipation of death.
Restatem~nt
(Second) Trusts, §45.
As adopted in Utah, this doctrine is even broader than
the rule proposed by the Restatement.
34 Utah 48,

95 P. 527, 530 (1908)

Thus, in Chadwick v. Arnold,

the court stated:

(I]f A, having no interest in the real estate, .ora~ly
agrees with B that the latte~ sho~ld ~urchase it with
his own funds and take the title in his own name, and
that he should thereafter convey it to A upon an agreed
price, no resulting or construc~iv~ trust arises, and
. such a contract is also within the statute of
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Thus, while in general the statute of frauds requires that a
conveyance of an interest in land be in writing, a \vell-recogni:
exception to this rule is that the statute is inapplicable to
creation of a trust.

~

As a consequence, in most equitable mortg'

cases, the statute is inapplicable because the courts which hav:
recognized the existence of an equitable mortgage have also recc
nized the existence of a constructive trust.

It follows that h

cases where no trust is present the enforcement of an equitable
mortgage may be barred by the statute of frauds.

This is the

significance of Section 45 of the Restatement and the rule set
forth in Chadwick v. Arnold, supra.
In the instant action, M.rs. Neil,having only a small
equitable interest in the property allegedly orally agreed with
defendants that they should purchase the property with their owr
funds and take title to a two-thirds interest in their own name,
and that they should convey it to Mrs. Neil upon an agreed price
Thus, even if plaintiff's allegations are true, under the rule
Chadwick v. Arnold, supra, the agreement is unenforceable under
the statute of frauds.
But even if the more liberal Restatement rule were
adopted, the necessary prereguisi tes to the creation of a cons\'
tive trust are not present.

These are:

(a) transfer under dur,

fraud or undue influence, or (b) transfer to one who holds a
confidential relationship to the transferor, or (c)
anticipation of death.
are not present here.

transfer~

It should be noted that these elements
The court specifically found that the d;

was not executed under the influence of fraud or duress.
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(Conclusion of Law No. 4, Tr. 113.)

Indeed, plaintiff has not

alleged the existence of fraud, duress or undue influence.

Simi-

larly, it is not contended--and the evidence would not support
such an allegation--that the tranferees, Mrs. Neil and the Hansens,
stood in a confidential relationship to the grantor, Mr. Newsome.
Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that the transfer was
made in anticipation of the transferor's death, nor does plaintiff
allege this to be the case.
Thus, the facts in the instant case do not give rise to
a finding that a constructive trust was created.

Because the

alleged arrangement between Hrs. Neil and the defendants was not in
writing, the transaction falls with the statute of frauds.
B.

THE DOCTRINES OF PART PERFORMANCE AND WRITTEN
MEMORANDUM ARE INAPPLICABLE

Plaintiff further contends that even if the statute of
frauds were otherwise applicable, the transaction in question is
taken out of the statute by reason of the doctrines of part
performance and written memorandum.

These doctrines are set forth

in the Utah Code as follows:
Section 25-5-3. Leases and Contracts for Interest in
Lands - Every contract . . . for the sale, of any lands,
or-aDy interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
v1r i ting subscribed by the party by whom the lease or
sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
Section 25-5-8. Right to Specific Performance Not
Affected - Nothing in this chapter contained shall
be construed to abridge the power of courts to compel
the specific performance of agreements in case of part
performance thereof.
Conceptually, both the doctrines of part performance and
·i_fi_c performance are based upon the same basic premise, namely,
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that an agreement otherwise unenforceable under the statute of
frauds will be enforced if the actions of the parties have so
clearly defined the terms of the contract as to permit its enforcement.

Thus, as to part performance, it has been stated:
[T]hree general criteria emerge in removing an oral
contract from the statute of frauds by part performance. First, the oral contract and its terms must
be clear and definite; second, the acts done in
performance of the contract must be equally clear
and definite; and third, the acts must be in reliance
on the contract. Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co.,
See also
6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (1956).
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds, §407.
Similarly, as to the doctrine of written memorandum,

it has been stated:
A memorandum sufficient to satisfy i..J,.::. requirement of
the statute of frauds must be complete in i~qelf as
to the parties to, and the essential terms of, ~~~
contract. The memorandum cannot rest partly in
writing and partly in parol; that is to say, a deficiency in the memorandum cannot be supplied by para!
evidence.
72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds, §296.
This court has also adopted the above rule.

In Birdu

v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952)
this court stated:
It is fundamental that the memorandum which is relied
upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all
the essential terms and provisions of the contract.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the mere
existence of a set of receipts purporting to acknowledge recei¢
of a certain sum of money from Mrs. Neil by Mrs. Hansen for "pa;
on house" does not necessarily take this case out of the
of frauds.

staW~

The critical question as raised by the above cited

authorities is whether the terms of the alleged contract are
clearly enough shown by part performance and by the receipts U
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permit enforcement thereof.
pact

perfor~ance

An examination of the alleged acts of

and of the receipts shows that the provisions

for which plaintiff seeks specific performance cannot be deduced
from the acts of Mrs. Neil and the Hansens.
As described above, the receipts typically show acknowledgment of a sum of money (usually $25.00} from Mrs. Neil by Mrs.
Hansen.

The document shows the date of the receipt, the balance

due and the fact that the payment was for "payment on home" or
"payment on house".

Even assuming that Mrs. Neil did in fact

receive the payments receipted--and she denies this fact-- the
last receipt shows a balance due of $1,055.00 (the first receipt
shows a beginning balance due of $2,389.00).
then, is:

The key question,

Do the above described receipts evidence the intention

of Mrs. Neil and the defendants to create a mortgage?

Defendants

respectfully submit that this question must be answered in the
negative.
It is important to note that the receipts in question
show any of a number of possible relationships between Mrs. Neil
and the defendants.

The following is a partial list of such possible

relationships:
1.

Mortgagor-Mortgagee

Admittedly, receipts like the ones in question could
show payrnen t by Hrs. Neil as mortgagor to the Hansens as mortgagees.
However, in view of the fact that the receipts cease in August,
1919, showing a remaining balance of in excess of 40 percent of the

starting balance, and in view of the fact that none of the receipts
1 ~fer

to a loan or to a mortgage, this explanation seems unlikely.
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Furthermore, if the defendants understood that they held a mon
in the subject property, it is difficult to understand why

th~

would have not foreclosed on their mortgage or to have exacted
interest on the underlying obligation.
2.

Contract of Sale

The receipts might also be interpreted to show that ti
Hansens were selling their two-thirds interest in the subjectp:
perty to Mrs. Neil by an oral installment contract.
3.

Repayment of Unsecured Loan

Since plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence of a
mortgage, it is also fair to assume that Mrs. Neil considered
herself to be indebted to the Hansens by virtue of their having
purchased the property with their own money and having placed Mr
Neil's name on the deed as a one-third interest holder.

The

receipts could therefore show an attempt by Hrs. Neil to repay
the Hansens for their having purchased her one-third interest,c
for their allowing her to remain in possession of the home and'.
keep the rent money.
4.

Welfare Payments

One other explanation for the existence of the recipt:
has been offered.

Mrs. Hansen testified that she gave her moth 0

the receipts without actually having received money to allow Hr:
Neil to qualify for extra welfare benefits.

The practice of

giving receipts was terminated in 1949 when rtrs. Neil

remarri~

and thus became ineligible for the benefits which had been obta
by use of the receipts.
The above discussion is not intended to convince thl'
court of the correctness of any one of the proposed
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explanati~

for the existence of the receipts.

Rather, it simply illustrates

the fact that the receipts are ambigious in describing the relationship between Mrs. neil and the defendants.
receipts are,

Thus, if the

indeed, memoranda as the plaintiff suggests, then

they are memoranda which do not set forth the terms of the alleged
contract with sufficient clarity to permit specific performance.
Recognizing this fact,

the trial court concluded:

8.
The receipts executed by Mrs. Hansen
sufficient to take the alleged agreement
the statute of frauds under the doctrine
performance or written memorandum.
(Tr.

were inout of
of part
114.)

Finally, it is clear that the doctrine of part performance has no application to this case, because that doctrine is
applicable only where plaintiff seeks specific performance.
Section 25-5-8, supra.

See

In the instant action, plaintiff has

specifically stated that her action for quiet title is based upon
the theory of equitable mortgage.

(Brief of Appellant, page 1.)

Furthermore, even if plaintiff changes her theory to specific
performance, her use of that remedy is barred by the statute of
limitations and by the fact that Mrs. Neil's performance was incomplete.

Thus,

it has been stated:

And although the promisee under a unilateral contract
is not entitled to specific performance while the
contract remains executory on his part, he may be
awarded specific performance after he has performed
his part of the contract.
The practical effect of this distinction is that
while contracts which lack mutuality may not be
specifically enforced as long as they are executory
on both sides, when the plaintiff has fully executed
his obligations he may be entitled to specific
performance.
71 Arn. Jur. 2d Specific Performance,
§26, at 44.
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Consistent with this doctrine, the trial court cone Ju
ded:

9. Even if the alleged agreement existed, plaintiff
would not be entitled to specific performance, since
Mrs. Neil did not complete her performance.
(Tr. 114.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the court correc
ruled that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of fraud:
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THAT THE
DOCTRINE OF LACHES BAR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
error~

Plaintiff alleges that the court below was in

it ruled that her claim was barred by Utah's statutes of limitations and by the doctrine of laches.

However, a review of the

proceedings below, as well as an examination of the applicable!
reveals that the court was correct in its ruling.

Defendants 1::

discuss these doctrines separately in the balance of this
A.

Poi~

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS APPLICABLE TO AN
EQUITABLE ACTION WHERE, LIKE HERE, THE PLAINTIFF
SEEKS AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff's attack on the court's finding that

the~

of limitations is applicable to the instant action is based upo
the premise that "a quiet title action is basically equitablel
therefore, not barred by any statute of limitations".
Brief, p. 16.)
proposition.

(Appella

Plaintiff cites no authority in support of~~
Indeed, an examination of the law reveals that t'

authorities do not support the rule proposed by the plaintiff.
Utah's Statute of Limitations makes no distinction bs
actions at law and at equity.

Section 78-12-1 states, for exY
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Civil actions can be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action
shall have accrued, except where in special cases a
differe~t limitation is prescribed by statute.
(Emphasis added)
Most jurisdictions have taken the position that an equitable action comes within the purview of "dragnet" or "catchall"
provisions such as Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Ann.

(1953).

Thus,

it has been stated:
A provision that an action for relief not thereinbefore provided for must be commenced within a prescribed period after the cause of action shall have
accrued has been held to apply to all suits in equity
not strictly of concurrent cognisance in law and
equity.
51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions,
§83.
The Utah Supreme Court adopted a similar position in the
case of Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 995 (1915).
There the plaintiff brought a quiet title action against a municipal
corporation in an attempt to remove a tax lien which had been imposed as the result of a special sewer tax.

Among other defenses

the defendant stated that the action was barred by Section 2883,
Comp. Laws of 1907 which provided:
An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for
must be com.menced within four years after the cause
of action shall have accrued.
The trial court concluded that the statute was not applicable, but
the Supreme court reversed saying:
We are very clearly of the opinion that, while
actions by which nothing is sought except to remove a cloud from or to quiet the title to real
property as against apparent or stale claims are
not barred by the statute of limitations, yet we
are also clear that all actions in which the
principle purpose is to obtain some affirmative
relief, as was the case here, clearly can come
Hithin the provisions of Section 2883, supra.
:1d., at 1001.
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A similar result was reached in Davidsen v. Salt
city, 95 Utah 347, 81 P. 2d 374

(1938).

La~

There plaintiff brovjlit

suit in equity seeking to have a deed set aside and to have ttti
to the subject property quieted in himself.

Plaintiff's comp4

asserted that the deed in question was obtained by fraud.

The

defendant raised as one of its defenses the applicable statub

0

limitations relating to an action for relief on the ground of fr
or mistake.

The trial court agreed with the defendant's content

and entered judgment for defendant.
affirmed.

On appeal, the Supreme Cour

In doing so, the court reiterated the rule of Brantfr
This court has also held that, although actions by
which nothing is sought except to remove a cloud
from or to quiet the title to real property as
against apparent or stale claims are not barred
by the statute of limitations, yet the statute does
apply to actions in which the principle purpose is
to obtain some affirmative relief.
Id., at 376.

The court then noted that in the case before it the

plaintiff~

sought affirmative relief in that he had sought cancellation of
deed.

Id.
Finally~

in McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801 (Utah

JC

the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court findi
that an action seeking in the alternative reformation of a warr:
deed, quiet title, and specific performance, was barred by Sect:
78-12-23, -25, and -26 of Utah's Statute of Limitations.
Thus, it is clear that plaintiff is mistaken in ass0
that an action to quiet title does not come within the statute
limitations.

On the contrary, the rule is that if plaintiff a:

part of her quiet title action seeks affirmative relief, the
statute of limitations \1ill bar recovery.
-28-
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<;:i!Yi Davidsen v. Salt Lake City, supra.

Therefore, the critical

question is whether plaintiff has, in fact, sought affirmative
relief.
In the instant action, plaintiff has stated that her
relief is based upon the theory that as between her as successor
to Mrs. Neil and the defendants there exists the relationship of
mortgagor/mortgagee.

Since title to the property currently reposes

in plaintiff and defendants as joint tenants by virtue of the deed
of 1944 and of the conveyance of .Mrs. Neil's subsequent conveyance
of her interest in the property to the plaintiff, it is clear that
what plaintiff actually seeks is either (1) reformation of the
1944 Deed to show Mrs. Neil as the sole owner, or (2) specific
performance of the alleged agreement between Mrs. Neil and the
defendants for conveyance of the defendant's two-thirds interest
in the property to Mrs. Neil upon payment of a certain sum.

In

either case, plaintiff seeks affirmative relief from this court.
As a result, the transaction in question is subject to the applicable statute of limitations.

(As more fully discussed in Point

II, plaintiff's reliance on the doctrine of part performance
indicates that specific performance is sought since §25-5-8
refers only to that remedy).
Plaintiff argues that Sections 78-12-25 and 78-12-26
cannot be applicable in the instant action because all actions
relating to real property are contained within Sections 78-12-2
to 78-12-21.

Because of the very long lapse of time involved in

this case, defendants hesitate to quibble over whether this court
0

hn~1a apply the limitations period of seven years adopted in cases
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_.41

relating to real property or to the shorter periods applicableL
other types of actions.

Indeed, even application of the

le~gtli

limitation period (eight years) would still result in a bar to
plaintiff's action.
In reality, i t appears the trial court was

correct~

concluding that plaintiff's action is barred by Sections
(3)

78-12~

and 78-12-25 which contain limitation periods of respective!

three and four years.

While plaintiff's complaint does not spea

specifically in terms of fraud or mistake, a review of the trial
transcript and of the documents filed by plaintiff indicates tha·
plaintiff's prayer for quiet title is based upon the
fraud or mistake was present.

allegati~:

Thus, under the holdings in David

v. Salt Lake City, and McConkie v. Hartman, supra, the three-yea:
limitations period of Section 78-12-26 appears applicable.

Othe:

wise, the trial court would have been justified in applying the
"catchall" provision of Section 78-12-25(2).

See Branting v.

~

Lake City, supra.
Assuming one or the other of the above provision to be
applicable, i t remains only to determine at what point the statu:
beg~n

to run.

Plaintiff appears to contend that the statutory

period would begin to run only upon the death of Mrs. Neil, les:
than a year prior to the commencement of this action.

The obvil

answer to such an argument is, of course, that the statutes of
limitation are designed to bar recovery on a particular causeo:
action, not the bringing of suit by a particular individual.

Tr

the statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon the
accrual of the cause of action.

51 Am. Jur.

2d Limitation of i!

§107. Sponsored
Theby thetime
for
bringing
ofprovided
an byaction
is and
not
renewed by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
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death of the aggrieved party or by the conveyance of the property.
Id., §408.

Section 78-12-26(3) states that a cause of action based
on the allegation of fraud or mistake accrues upon "the discovery
by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake".

Similarly, in Branting v. Salt Lake City, supra, the

court held that the four-year statute of limitations began to run
when the tax which resulted in the lien was levied, and therefore
became a matter of public record.

Thus, in the instant case the

limitations period would run from the date when Mrs. Neil became
aware that the Hansens asserted ownership of a fee, rather than a
mortgage, interest in the subject property.

The evidence suggests

several possible dates at the time of which Mrs. Neil had such
knowledge.

For example, by a letter dated September 30, 1958,

(Exhibit 14-P.) Mrs. Hansen in response to a letter written to
her and her husband by Mrs. Neil's attorney stated that in the event
of a sale of the house, Mrs. Neil would receive one-third of the
proceeds and they, the Hansens, would receive two-thirds.

She

wrote:
So we offered her our little, new rambler to live
in and sell her house and finish the one we have
started for ourselves and give her 1/3 of the
money we got from the house to live on or whatever she wanted to do. Ive asked nothing except
2/3rds.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Since it is plaintiff's contention that Mrs. Neil and
the defendants bore the relationship of mortgagor-mortgagee, it is
clear that the above quotation would put a reasonable person on
n0tice that the alleged ''mortgagees" claimed a two-thirds interest
th0

~ubject property,

and that their claim was one of fee
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j

ownership.
Plaintiff herself admits that

~1rs.

Neil knew as

earl~·

as 1964 that defendants claimed a two-thirds interest in the pro
perty as joint tenants with Mrs. Neil.

In that year, Mrs. neil

approached a second attorney with the request that he draft two
quit claim deeds relating to the subject property.

The first of

these deeds showed Hrs. Neil as grantor and plaintiff as grantee
The

second reversed their positions by showing plaintiff as

granter and Mrs. Neil as grantee.

According to plaintiff, the

express purpose of these deeds was to sever the joint tenancy
between Mrs. Neil and the defendants.

As to the circumstances

leading up to the execution of these deeds, the plaintiff offen
the following testimony at trial:
Q. Now, Mrs. Rogers, I'd like to refer to the
conversation which took place in the office of Mr.
Dwight King, and I refer to plaintiff's Exhibit Nos.
3-P and 4-P.
Are these deeds deeds which were executed in Mr. King's office?
A. Yes they were.
Q.
And were you present when they were executed1
A. Yes.
Q.
I don't understand why these deeds were giver
A. To break the joint tenancy with Hansens and
mother.
Q.
Then I gather your mother knew [at] the time
of the making of these deeds the Hansens claimed a
joint tenancy interest in the property; is that
correct?
A. Yes.
(Tr. 38-39.)

Finally, several of the witnesses at trial

testifi~i

to a meeting which took place in 1968 between I!rs. Neil, the
plaintiff, the defendants and other members of the family.

m~

there is some disagreement as to the details of that meeting, t·
witnesses were all in agreement that the discussion related to
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interest which the Hansens claimed in the subject property.
plaintiff testified that in the meeting the defendants

Thus,

openly

laid claim to a fee interest in the property:

Q.
Isn't it true that they [the Hansens] denied
that--or, isn't it true that they stated that the house
was theirs?
A. Yes, they claimed that it was theirs; that it
was their "retirement fund," they said.
(Tr. 30.)
Similarly, Mrs. Neil's daughter, Gladys Tidwell, testified that in the course of the conversation, Mrs. Hansen stated that
if the house were sold she would take "her share".

(Tr. 51.)

Hrs. Hansen testified that at the meeting she stated in
her mother's presence that there was no mortgage.

(Tr. 90.)

The above described testimony, as well as other testimany relating to the 1968 meeting demonstrate that as a result of
that meeting Mrs. Neil and the plaintiff were aware that the
Hansens claimed a fee rather than a mortgage interest
property.

in the

Since the present action was filed in September, 1975,

and since the meeting took place in the summer of 1968, it is
clear that even application of the seven-year

~tatute

of limi-

tations will not save plaintiff's action from the bar of the
statute of limitations.
B.

PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE
OF LACHES

But even i f i t is concluded that the relief prayed for
by plaintiff requires no affirmative action by the court and that

the statutes of limitations are therefore not applicable, it is
clear that laches

bars this action.
-33-

This court has stated:
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A court of equity has always refused to aid stale
demands, where the party has slept upon his rights
and acquiesced for a great length of time .
latches and neglect are always discontenanced.
Ruthrauf f v. Silver King \·iestern Mininq & Mill Co.,
95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 338, 347 (1938).
While the doctrine of lac hes·· does not require any
particular length of delay, it has been generally acknowledged
that a court of equity should look to the analogous statute of
limitations in determining whether a delay will be deemed

unr~~

ble:
[U]nder ordinary circumstances, a suit in equity will
not be stayed for laches ~efore and will be stayed
after the time fixed by the analogous statute of
limitations of law . . . 1 Pomeroy's Equitable Remedies, §20 (3rd Edition, 1905).
In the instant case, it should be noted that plaintiff'
theory of equitable mortgage is closely analogous to an actiont
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, or an action upon

a~

tract obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing.

The statutes of limitations for such actions are,

respectively, three and four years.
78-12-25, Utah Code Ann.

(1953).

Section 78-12-26(3) and

As noted in the above discussir

relating to the running of the statute of limitations, the evide·
indicates that Mrs. Neil knew as early as 1958, and in no case
later than 1968, that the Hansens claimed a fee interest in the
property.

Thus, using the applicable statute of limitations M

an equitable "rule of thumb" it is apparent that a sufficient
length of time has elaps9d to invoke the defense of

lach~s.

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the bar
laches

oi

requires not only the lapse of time, but the prejudicii

of the other party because of an unexcused delay.
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Jacobson v.

Jacobson,
§169.

557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); see also Am. Jur. 2d Equity,

In Jacobson v. Jacobson, supra, the court pointed to two

sets of facts showing the type of prejudice through delay which
.,·ould permit invocation of la Ches..

1

death of one of the parties and,
property.

Those factors were:

(1)

(2) increase in value of the

Id., at 159.
The instant action offers strikingly similar facts.

At least two material witnesses have died since Mrs. Neil became
aware of the defendant's claim to the property.

The first and

most important of these witnesses is Mrs. Neil herself who died
on August 24, 1975.

The other potential witness was Mrs. Neil's

attorney, Emmett L. Brown, who died on October 17, 1972.

96.)

(Tr.

Similarly, defendants request that this court take notice

of the fact that since the time of the execution of the 1944
Deed, real property, including the subject property, has increased
greatly in value.
Defendants were further prejudiced by the fact that
many of the witnesses were unable to recall details of events
which had transpired many years before.

William A. Newsome, the

grantor under the 1944 Deed, could not even recall having entered
into the real estate contract with Hrs. Neil and her husband
1~ich

had resulted in the execution of the deed.

Neither could

he remember receiving a downpayment of installments under the
contract, execution of the deed, or the reason why the buyers
under the contract were different from the grantees under the deed.
I Tr.
11 1
: •

13-18.)

·,211

Similarly, at the time of her deposition, Mrs.

could neither recall the execution of the receipts, nor the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-35-

purpose for which they were executed.
Hansen, page 12.)

(Deposition of Annie N.

Under such circumstances, defendants have

suffered obvious prejudice to the preparation of their defense.
This prejudice should raise the defense of laches

to bar plain-

tiff's recovery, for, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:
[W]here the seal of death has closed the lips of
those whose character is involved, and lapse of time
has impaired the recollection of transactions and
obscured their details, the welfare of society
demands the rigid enforcement of the rule of
diligence. Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224, 274,
3 6 L. Ed. 13 4 , 15 3
A

( 18 9 2) •

final example of the prejudice which defendants have

suffered by virtue of the delay of plaintiff's predecessor in
interest in bringing this action can be found in the fact that
the defendants made expenditures for the improvement of the property in reliance upon the fact that they were fee title owners.
These expenditures included financial participation in the rernod
ing of the house, performance of plumbing and electrical work,
and occasional payment of property taxes.

(Tr. 74-75.)

Thus, defendants have met the burden of showing that
the delay in bringing this action has caused them prejudice.

~

such facts, the court below concluded:

12.
Because of plaintiff's and plaintiff's predeces~
delay in bringing an action to quiet title to this
property, defendants suffered prejudice to the prepa~
tion of their defense because of the deaths of severa.
potentially key witnesses and the loss of memory of
pertinent events on the part of other witnesses. In
addition, defendants have suffered financial injury t.
virtue of their expenditure of money for the proper0
in the belief that they had a clear unencunbered rigr.
thereto. Plaintiff's claim is therefore barred by tr
doctrine of laches.
(Tr. 114.)

-36-
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Plaintiff attempts to avoid this conclusion by directing
this court's attention to a number of exceptions to the doctrine
of laches.

Defendants will attempt to deal briefly with these

exceptions as they relate to this case.
1.

Intimate Personal Relationship

Plaintiff argues that because of the intimate personal
relationship between Mrs. Neil and the defendants, Mrs. Neil
was excused from bringing an action for quiet title.

A reading of

the authorities cited by plaintiff for this proposition shows that
the rationale adopted by those authorities is that the accrual of
a cause of action may be delayed where, because of the close
personal relationship of the potential litigants, the party who
may seek enforcement of his rights is not given sufficient notice
of the adverse claim of the other.

That the existence of an

intimate personal relationship does not prevent the raising of
lathes

as a defense is clearly shown by Jacobson v. Jacobson, supra.

There the plaintiff and his wife sought to quiet title in themselves as against the plaintiff's father and mother.

The court

nonetheless granted judgment in favor of the defendants based upon
the laches. _
In the instant action, there can be no doubt that notwithstanding the close relationship between defendants and Mrs.
Neil she nonetheless had notice on several occasions of their
adverse interest in the subject property.

Her delay in bringing

this action is therefore inexcusable for the purpose of holding
laches

in abeyance.
2.

Possession of the Property
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Plaintiff next asserts that because her predecessor,
H.-cs. Neil, was in continual possession of the property from 194c
until her death, the doctrine of laches

has no application.

While it cannot be doubted that possession of the property is a
factor to which the courts will look in deciding \1hether delay i
bringing an action is excusable, it does not follow that this
factor alone prevents application of the doctrine of laches ..
Indeed, the significance of the plaintiff's possession in a suU
in which laChes.

is raised as a defense lies in the fact that su:

possession may give rise to the valid belief in the plaintiff thi
his right to the property is undisputed.

Thus, it has been helci

that where one of several joint tenants or tenants in common is
in exclusive possession of land, the other tenants are not charge
ble with laChes.
to them.

;.mless they actually know he is holding adverse.

Reed v. Bachman,

61 W.Va. 452, 57 S.E. 769, 772 (1901)

As with such factors as the relationship of the parties, the tr'
issue is whether the party against whom laches

is asserted had

notice of the adverse claim and of the claimant's intention to
assert it.
This conclusion is consistent with

Viersen v. Boettch

387 P.2d 133 (Okla. 1963), which is cited in plaintiff's Brief.
Although that case related to the applicability of a statute of
limitations rather than the doctrine of laches,

it is nonetheli

useful in reaching an understanding of the importance, or lack
thereof, of possession by a party against whom laches

is asset

There plaintiffs claiming fee title ownership in the subject
property based upon a sheriff's deed sought to quiet title as
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ayainst the defendants.

Defendan~~ ~ounterclaimed

Lo a one-half mineral interest in themselves.

to quiet title

Plaintiffs, as

d2fense to defendants counterclaim, claimed that the counterclaim
was barred by the 15-year limitations period applicable to such
actions.

(Defendants' claim to the property was based upon a

deed executed more than 15 years prior to the commencement of the
law suit).

The trial court agreed with plaintiff's assertion and

hPld that the counterclaim was barred by the statute.

On appeal,

however, the Supreme Court reversed, saying that defendants had
inadequate notice of plaintiff's claim to the property.

The court

stated:
The execution and recording of oil and gas leases
by a mineral co-tenant, standing alone, will not
support a claim of adverse possession to severed
mineral [sic] which are owned by and in the constructive possession of another.
[citations ommitted]
Possession of the surfarA hy the surface owner constitutes no noticeable claim of adverse possession
to the owner of the mineral estate.
Id., at 138.
Thus, the critical question in a case where the party
against whom laches is asserted has been in possession is whether
delay in bringing a quiet title action is "excusable", i.e.,
whether the party in possession had notice of the adverse claim
of the party raising the defense of laches.
In this context, it is important to note that the court
below found that Mrs. Neil had the requisite notice to raise the
defense of laches.

It stated:

10.
Plaintiff's predecessor, Mrs. Neil, had notice
of defendants' claim of a two-thirds interest in the
subject property as early as 1958. Notice of.de~en
dant' s claim was also communicated to Mrs. Neil in
1968.

(R.

114.)
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3.

Mrs. Neil's Illness

In a further attempt to avoid application of laches,
plaintiff asserts that

l~s.

Neil's delay in bringing a quiet

title action was excusable because she "was quite ill and did nc
wish to sue her own daughter."

(Appellant's Brief 19.)

Whether Mrs. Neil's illness provides a sufficient basL
for a finding of excusable neglect depends, of course, on the
nature and length of that illness.

If, for example, Mrs. Neil

had been insane from the time she discovered defendants' adverse
claim until the time of her death, defendants would readily concc
that her neglect in bringing a quiet title action would be
sable".

"e~~

Here, however, plaintiff's OV'n testimony makes it

abundantly clear that Mrs. Neil's illness was not of a type whk
would have prevented her from seeking to quiet title.

At trial

the following colloquy took place between defendants' counsel an:
plaintiff:

Q. You testified that your mother was sick
during the last few years of her life. When did
her serious illnesses begin? You said she had
heart trouble, for example.
Do you know when her
heart trouble started up?
A.
I don't know when it started, no.
But
she started to become ill about, oh, maybe nine,
ten years before she died.
Q. Was she able to get around at all?
A.
Yes, she would. She would get around;
very determined lady.
Q. For example, you said back in 1964 you
had to go to Mr. King's office back then. Nould
you say that she \vas --.
A.
She could get around on the bus; yes.
Q.
Was her mind clear during her later
years?
A.
Yes.
Q. Was she able to behave rationally?
A. Yes.
Q.
Did she require someone in attendance
with her at all times?
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A.

Not until the last month, month and a

half.
Q.
And up until that time she was able to
take care of herself?
A.
Pretty much; yes.
(Tr. 46-47.)

The above testimony shows that Mrs. Neil suffered a
lingering illness which lasted nine or ten years.

During that

time her mind was clear, she was active, and she was able to "get
around" without help from others.

Indeed, other evidence referred

to above indicates that in 1958 and in 1964 she went to the
offices of two different attorneys for advice as to the ownership
of the property.
Under the circumstances, it cannot be doubted that had
~s.

Neil so desired, she would have been perfectly capable of

obtaining the help of family members and of her attorneys for
the purpose of bringing a quiet title action.

Thus, there is no

substance to the allegation that her illness provided an excuse
for delaying the institution of this action.
In conclusion, plaintiff's contention that the statutes
of limitations and the doctrine of lathes
this action is clearly incorrect.

are inapplicable in

The statute of limitations is

applied in equitable actions where, as here, plaintiff has sought
affirmative relief from the courts.

But even if the statute were

inapplicable, the equitable doctrine of laches .. would bar plaintiff's action because plaintiff's predecessor in interest delayed
in excess of eight years in seeking to quiet title and because
such delay prejudiced defendants.
-41-
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POINT IV
THE COURT CORRCCTLY RULED THAT THE 1944 DEED C?,I:ATI:D
A ONE-THIRD INTEREST IN EACH OF THE THREE GR.11.~~TEI::S

In Point IV of her brief, plaintiff advances that nove
theory tr.at the 1944 Deed by >vhich the Newsomes conveyed their
interest in the subject property to Mrs. Neil and to defendants
created a one-half interest in defendants and a one-half
in Mrs. Neil.

inter~

According to plaintiff, this theory "is based fir

upon the general rule that a conveyance to three people, two of

whom are husband and wife, results in the husband and wife takin

one-half of the estate and the third party taking the other half
of the estate."

(Appellant's Brief 22.)

While plaintiff is certainly to be commended for the
originality of her theory, an examination of the authorities
proves her contention to be without merit.
As a starting point in examining plaintiff's contentio
two principals must be kept in mind.

First, the doctrine propos

by plaintiff has only been recognized in states which have adopt
the concept of tenancy by the entireties.

All of the cases cite

by plaintiff in her brief in support of the above doctrine conta
adknowledgment

by the courts that the decisions are based upon

existence of such a tenancy.

Indeed, plaintiff acknowledges thi

fact when she states:
The essence of this first basis for conr.ending
appellant is entitled to one-half rather than
one-third of the subject property is the common
law concept of tenancy by the entirety and
tenancy by the entirety exists in Utah.
(Appellant's Brief 23.)
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Second, the proposed rule is at best a rule of construetion relating to the intention of the parties.
In the remainder of this Point, defendants will consider
the affect of these principals in relation to the theory proposed
by plaintiff.

A.

THE RULE OF CONSTRUCTION PROPOSED BY PLAINTIFF
HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE
UTAH HAS NOT ADOPTED THE DOCTRINE OF TENANCY
BY THE ENTIRETIES

The doctrine of tenancy by the entireties is based upon
the legal fiction that a husband and wife are a single legal entity.
Thus, a conveyance to a husband and wife and to a third party is
said to be a conveyance to two, rather than three, entities.
'!.

Dolsay, 132 N.J. Eq. 121, 27 A.2d 155, 157 (1942); 4 A.

Powell, The Law of Real Property, 686 (1977).
purely a creation of the cornrnon law.

Mosser
R.

This doctrine was

Id. at 685.

Plaintiff fails to direct the court's attention to a
single Utah case or statute adopting the doctrine of tenancy by
the entireties.

Defendants have been similarly unsuccessful in

finding such authority.

Undaunted by this fact, however, plaintiff

points out that the doctrine is one of common law and that unless
expressly abrogated by statute, the common law, including tenancy
by

the entireties, is adopted in Utah.

As support for this pro-

position, plaintiff points to Section 68-3-1, Utah Code Ann.
11953), which states:

The common law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to, or in conflict with . . . the
constitution or laws of this state, and so far
only as it is consistent with and adopted to
the natural and physical conditions of this
state and the necessities of the people hereof,
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of
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The language of the above statute makes it clear th 3 t
plaintiff is not correct in alleging that "the common law is
specifically adopted in Utah unless abrogated by statute . .
(Appellant's Brief 23.)

Rather, the correct rule is that the

corrunon law is abrogated to the extent it is inconsistent with the
laws of the State.

It therefore remains to be determined

whether any Utah statute is inconsistent with the common law
doctrine that a conveyance to a husband and wife creates a tenanc
by the entireties or that a husband and wife are treated as a
single legal entity.
Section 57-1-5, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) states:

Every interest in real estate granted to two or
more persons in their ovm rights shall be a
tenancy in common, unless expressly declared in
the grant to be otherwise. Use of the words
"joint tenancy" or "with rights of survivorship"
or "and to the survivor of them" or words of
similar import shall declare a joint tenancy.
A sole owner of real property shall create a
joint tenancy in himself and another or others
by making a transfer to himself and such other
or others as joint tenants by use of such
words as herein provided or by conveying to
another person or persons an interest in land
in which an interest is retained by the granter
and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy
by use of such words as herein provided.
In all
cases the interest of joint tenants must be equal
and undivided.
The above section is clearly inconsistent with the
concept of tenancy by the entireties.

The statute does not

differentiate between grantees who are married to one another
and other types of grantees.

Thus, under the statute, a conveya

to a married couple creates either a tenancy in common or a joi::
tenancy.

By contrast, if tenancy by the entireties were recog-

nizedSponsored
in bythis
state, a conveyance to two grantees who are husb 1
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and wife would create a tenancy by the entireties.
Furthermore, under the above statute a conveyance to
several grantees in joint tenancy creates an interest in each of
the joint tenants which "must be equal and undivided."
(Emphasis added.)

Id.,

But in states which have adopted the doctrine

of tenancy of the entireties, a grant to three grantees in joint
tenancy, two of whom are husband and wife, results in the spouses
each receiving a one-quarter, and the third grantee a one-half,
interest.

In short, the interests of the joint tenants are not

"equal".
From the foregoing,

it is clear that the concept of

tenancy by the entireties is "inconsistent" with Section 57-1-5,
supra.

This common law doctrine is therefore not within the body

of common law grafted into Utah law under Section 68-3-1, supra.
While the Utah Supreme Court has not expressly denied
the existence of tenancies by the entireties in this state, the
court has written decisions whose results are inconsistent with
the existence of such a tenancy.
Contos,

Thus, in Clearfield State Bank v.

562 P.2d 622 (Utah 1977), the court held that a creditor

foreclosing upon the interest of one of two joint tenants becomes
a tenant in common with the remaining spouse.

Id., at 624-625.

It is well-settled that there is no right of survivorship as
between tenants in common; i.e., the heirs of the deceased tenant
in common, rather than other co-tenants, inherit the interest of
the decedent.

Thus, when the court in Contos, supra, held that

the right of either spouse was alienable and that the purchaser
rif

one spouse 1 s interest becomes a tenant in common with the
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other spouse, it was, in effect, saying that no right of survivorship existed between the remaining spouse and the purchaser.
The rule in Contos is inconsistent with the theory that
a conveyance to a married couple creates a tenancy by the entireties.

The reason for this is that such a tenancy creates the

right of survivorship between the spouses, even if one has
conveyed his interest to a third party.

Powell, supra, at 712.

Thus, in Sieb's Hatcheries v. Lindley, 111 F. Supp. 705, 716 (W.D.
Ark. 1953), the court stated:
But, neither a conveyance by one tenant by the
entirety, nor an execution against such tenant,
can in any manner affect the interest of the
other tenant.
[Citations omitted]
Thus, a
purchaser of the interest of one tenant by the
entirety cannot oust the other tenant from
possession, and can only claim one-half of
the rents and profits.
[Citations omitted]
The remaining tenant is not only entitled to
possession plus one-half of the rents and
profits, but the right of survivorship is not
destroyed or in any wise affected.
(Emphasis
added.)
Similarly, in McLean v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D.
Mich. 1963) the court said:
One incident of an estate by the entirety is that
the survivor, whether husband or wife, is entitled
to the whole, and such right cannot be defeated by
a conveyance by one spouse to a stranger.
It follows that in states recognizing tenancies by the
entireties, the purchaser of the interest of one tenant by the
entireties may be cut off if the tenant from whom he purchased
predeceases the other tenant.

Such a result is inconsistent wit

Section 57-1-6, supra, permitting creation of a tenancy in conuno
between "two or more persons"

(including spouses), and the a!Jovr

quoted language from Clearfield State Bank v.

Contos, supra.
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In an attempt to pursuade the court of the continued
existence of tenancies by the entireties in Utah, plaintiff cites
several statutes referring to such tenancies.
75-2-1003 and 48-1-4 (2), Utah Code Ann.

See §§ 78-41-1,

(1953).

While it is

true that these statutes do make reference to tenancies by the
entireties, it does not follow that these references show a desire
on the part of the Utah legislature to acknowledge the creation of
such tenancies in this state as the product of Utah law.

A more

logical explanation for such references is that the legislature
recognized that a tenancy by the entireties could be established
in personal property located in another state, and that that
property could be brought into this State.

Thus, when §78-41-1

states that upon the death of one whose death "shall affect any
other interest in property", any person interested in the property

may petition the court for a determination of his interest, it is
unlikely that the statute is intended as recognition of the
doctrine of community property, even though an interest in community
property may be "any other interest in property" within the meaning
of the statute.

Similarly, where §48-1-4 states that a tenancy

by the entireties does not of itself establish a partnership,

that fact in itself does not show legislative recognition of the
creation of such tenancies under Utah law any more than reference
in the statute to community property would show that community
property interests could be created in Utah.

At best, these

statutes simply show an awareness on the part of the legislature
uf

the existence of tenancies by the entireties and of the fact

~ h.i'

[Jroµerty in which such tenancies are be created in other
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jurisdictions may be brought into this state.
B.

THE PARTIES TO THE 1944 DEED INTENDED TO CREATE
A JOINT TENANCY

Even assuming, arguendo, that a tenancy by the entireties may be created under Utah law, it does not fol low that the
1944 Deed created such a tenancy.

At best, the rule

plaintiff is a rule of construction.

proposed~

Thus, it has been stated:

At common law a conveyance to husband and wife
and another party presumptively granted a onehalf interest to the third party and a one-half
interest to the husband and wife as an entirety.
2 H. Tiffany, Real Property, Section 431 at 222-23
(1939).
But this axiom is only a rule of construction and the intent of the parties must be
effected if it can be ascertained. Daniel v.
Wright, 352 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.C.D.C. 1972)
(emphasis added).
From the foregoing it can be seen that the rule proposed by plaintiff is a rule of construction which creates a
presumption in favor of the creation of a tenancy by the entireties.

In cases involving a conveyance to multiple parties, Utah

has adopted a contrary presumption:
Where a conveyance is made in the names of a
number of parties to an instrument, and the
conveyance does not show respective interests,
the presumption is that they own in equal
shares, but such presumption is rebuttable by
parol evidence. Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184
72 p. 2d 4 4 9, 4 5 2 ( 19 3 7) .
Similarly, Section 57-1-5, _supra, states, "in all cases the inte:
of joint tenants must be equal and undivided."

Thus, the ruleo

construction adopted in Utah appears to be ~he following:

(a)

a conveyance to two or more individuals is conclusively presume:
to create a tenancy in common in the absence of the use of the
words "joint tenancy" or words of like import.
supra.

(b)

In the event of the creil tion of

i1

Section 57-1-S,
tenancy in conuno."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-48-

and absent language in the granting clause to the contrary, a
rebuttable presumption arises that the parties intended that each
of the co-tenants will take his interest in equal shares.
v. Ellison, supra.

Garrett

(c) Where a conveyance is made to two or more

individuals who are designated as "joint tenants" such tenants
are conclusively presumed to have taken their interest in
shares.

Section 57-1-5, supra.

equal

If, as plaintiff insists, a tenancy

by the entireties may be created in this state, the only manner in
which that could occur consistent with Section 57-1-5 and with
the decision in Garrett v. Ellison, is if the document of conveyance
specifically recites the fact that the grantees take as tenants
by the entireties.
The 1944 Deed at issue in this case does not conform to
the above requirements, if a tenancy by the entireties between
defendants had been intended.

The Deed states:

To Myrtle c. Neil and Annie N. Hansen and Albert J.
Hansen, her husband as joint tenants and not as
tenants in common and to the survivors or survivor of
them.
Clearly under Section 57-1-5 the above formulation
creates the relationship of joint tenancy between the three grantees
with each taking a one-third interest in the subject property.
While the deed is clear enough on its face as to not require parol
evidence in determining the intent of the parties thereto, it is
relevant to note that the trial court found that the granters under
the deed intended to convey the property in joint tenancy to
defendants and Hrs. Neil.

(R. 111, Finding No. 7.)

Thus, even if this court holds that a tenancy by the
irctios may be created under Utah law, the findings of the
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trial court, as well as Section 57-1-5, Utah Code Ann.

(1953),

support the court's conclusion of law and its judgment thut de[,
dants each took a one-third interest as joint tenants under the
1944 Deed.

CONCLUSION
The linchpin of plaintiff's attack on the decision of
the trial court is the proposition that the evidence did not sup;
the court's finding that the 1944 Deed was intended to convey fee
title in the subject property to
tenants.

Mrs. Neil and defendants as joi

Unless this court finds that there was insufficient ev:

dence to support the trial court's findings, plaintiff's argumen'
as to the inapplicability of the statute of frauds, the statutec
limitations, and the doctrine of laches is irrelevant.
Defendants have demonstrated by reference to the trial
transcript that there was ample evidence to support the trial co':
judgment.

While defendants are of the opinion that plaintiff's

evidence was woefully inadequate for the purpose of overturning
a

~eed

absolute, that fact, too, is irrelevant in light of the

finding of the tryer of fact that the parties to the 1944 Deed
intended to create precisely those interests which are described
the granting clause; namely, a joint tenancy between Mrs. Neila·
the defendants.
Similarly, plaintiff's theory that the conveyance to Mr
Neil and defendants as joint tenants created a one-half interest
Mrs. Neil and a one-half interest in the defendants is basical~
a question of intent.

In reviewing the evidence the trial coL1C

-so-
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concluded that the intent of the parties was to create a onethird

i~terest

in each of the grantees.

This court has always recognized the principal that the
tryer of fact is better able to analyze and weigh
than is an appellate court.

the evidence

This court has therefore adopted the

view that it should survey the record in light favorable to the
findings of the tryer of fact.

Kesler v. Rogers, supra.

Since

the record of the proceedings below shows that there was ample
evidence to support the court's findings, plaintiff's appeal must
be denied.
Furthermore, the failure of the alleged parol agreement
between Mrs. Neil and defendants to qualify as a constructive
trust means that the mortgage would be unenforceable under the
statute of frauds.

Similarly, because of the lapse of time in

enforcing the agreement, plaintiff's claim is barred by latches and
the applicable statute of limitations.
Respectfully submitted

this~

day of December, 1977.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Attorneys for Respondents
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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